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1. The background of the research and its importance 
The dissertation is intended to explore why we have recently experienced rather irregular 
political events in Britain. Such irregular events were the 2010 coalition government between the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, the 2011 AV referendum on the electoral system 
reform, the 2014 surprise victory of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) at the 
European Parliamentary elections, the 2014 independence referendum in Scotland, the 2016 
Brexit referendum and the 2017 snap election. These events do not fit into the general concept of 
Westminster democracy (Lijphart, 1984, 2012). Though it was right previously to label Britain as 
a Westminster democracy, there are so many irregularities today that we have to reconsider the 
validity of this concept for Britain. I argue that the irregularities of Westminster democracy can 
be seen as regularities from another perspective. We just have to find this alternative perspective. 
The dissertation starts its investigation from the presumption that British party politics today 
occurs in different arenas. These arenas have separated from each other over time. What we can 
see is that the parliamentary arena (derived from MP seats) and the electoral arena (derived from 
electoral votes) have particularly separated. The dissertation observes this process between 1945 
and 2015. It clearly proves that the parliamentary arena has remained a two-, or two-and-a-half 
party system over time, however, the electoral arena has been continuously pluralising: it was a 
two-party system in the 1950s, nevertheless, after the 1970s and particularly in the 1990s and 
2000s it has become a moderate (or extreme) party system. This pluralisation in the electoral 
arena contributed to a split between the parliamentary and electoral arenas. This split can be 
responsible for various things: for the decline of major parties, for the emergence of the smaller 
(third) parties, for the legitimacy crisis of the first-past-the-post electoral system, for the 
popularity of regional (devolution) interest representation and for growing anti-establishment 
sentiment. So we can assume that the irregular political events after 2010 are irregularities (and 
surprising) only from the Westminster democracy perspective. However, from the split theory 
perspective, they are not irregularities. Instead, they are the natural consequences of the split 
process. 
The findings of this research are new in Hungary. This scientific approach has not been used 
until now. Although Nagy (2015: 125─144) analyzes this split problem in his book on electoral 
disproportionality, he uses the British example only for a case study of electoral distortion. So he 
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does not go into such detail about British politics as I do. Of course, this research better known 
among British scholars than among Hungarians. There are a couple of British scholars who have 
already underlined the importance of the split in the British party system. I particularly relied on 
the findings of Webb (2000), Bogdanor (2004) and Mair (2009). They all emphasise the 
importance of pluralisation in British party politics and the potential split that it might cause. 
Apart from them, I also used the following works: Mitchell (2005), Bardi and Mair (2008), 
Gallagher and Mitchell (2008), Dunleavy (1995, 1999) and many more. The scientific approach 
of Webb (2000) and Bogdanor (2004) was particularly sensible. They thought that the evolution 
of British party politics can be classified in the following way: 
Webb (2000) Bogdanor (2004) 
Period Patterns of competition Period Patterns of competition 
 
1906─1914 
Imbalance (minority and majority 
governments) without universal 
suffrage 
1918─1931 
Imbalance (majority, minority and 
coalition governments) with universal 
suffrage 
1945─1970 
Two-party dominance 
Two- party combined vote share 
over 90%, balanced two-party 
competition, single governments, 
regular alternation, no third 
parties 
1935─1970 
Two-party stability 
based on popular support 
1974─today 
Two-party decline 
Two party combined vote share 
under 90%, imbalanced two-party 
competition, long predominant 
cycles, alternation is less 
frequent, third party popularity 
and influence grows 
1974─1992 
Superficial two-party stability 
based less on popular support and 
more on the first-past-the-post 
electoral system 
 1997─today 
The emergence of devolved 
competitions 
 
My dissertation has certain novelty for British scholars as well. I introduced a new approach for 
understanding the different periods in the evolution of British party politics. This approach used 
critical junctures instead of the intervals. Whilst Webb (2000) and Bogdanor (2004) observe and 
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classify different time intervals in British party politics according to the existing patterns of party 
interaction, I preferred focusing on the beginnings of each time interval. With this method, I 
wanted to understand the dynamics of change in British politics at different moments which 
served later as path dependencies for the upcoming years. I expected from this method that I can 
evaluate and understand better the reasons of change in British politics. Therefore, I identified 
four critical junctures in British politics. This is in harmony with Webb’s (2000) and Bogdanor’s 
(2004) classifications as well: (1) the 1945 general election, (2) the 1974 February and October 
general elections, (3) the 1997 general election and (4) the 2010─2015 general elections. I had 
two critical junctures with single electoral years (in 1945 and in 1997) and two critical junctures 
with combined electoral years (in February─October 1974  and in 2010─2015.) The long critical 
junctures in February─October 1974 and in 2010─2015 are the result of several inter-dependent 
events which can be scarcely separated from one another. For instance, between 2010 and 2015 
many political events happened which can be scarcely explained by using only the 2010 or the 
2015 electoral years. However, if they are combined, lots of interim events such as the 2011 AV 
referendum or the 2014 EP elections can be understood. So, in sum, this method of using critical 
junctures for the analysis of the evolution of the British party system can be considered as a 
novelty even in Britain. Previously, British scholars used long continuous periods instead. 
Nevertheless, my method did not contradict their earlier studies. It could further confirm them 
from another point of view. 
My classification of the evolution of British party politics can be found in the table below. 
Again, they are the result of the critical junctures I identified. This categorisation is very similar 
to that of Webb (2000), Bogdanor (2004) or Nagy (2015). The novelty which arose from the 
method of critical junctures is the dynamics of the party competition. The dynamics (centripetal 
or centrifugal) are included in the table as well. 
Table 2. My categorisation of the evolution of British party politics 
Period Split Dynamics of the party 
competition 
Description 
1945─1974 Marginal Centripetal (based on issues), 
centrifugal (based on class 
competition) 
Classical two- party system. 
Almost perfect overlap between the 
parliamentary and electoral arenas. 
The congruence is very high. 
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1974─1997 Growing Centrifugal (based on issues) The beginning of the split in the 
party system.  
The decline of two-partyism in the 
electoral arena, however, relatively 
strong two-partyism in the 
parliamentary arena. 
Growing but still low incongruence. 
1997─2010 Large Centripetal (based on issues) The superficial survival of two-
partyism. 
Two-partyism in the parliamentary 
arena and pluralisation in the 
electoral arena. 
The incongruence is significant. 
2010─2015 Extreme Centripetal (based on issues) The burst of pluralisation. 
Record high pluralisation in the 
electoral arena which also spills over 
into the parliamentary arena. The 
signs of pluralisation in the 
parliamentary arena are the coalition 
government, new issues on the 
agenda, the proliferation of referenda 
and the manifestos of major parties 
react to third party challenges. 
 
2. The methodology of the dissertation 
I applied two scientific disciplines when I wrote this dissertation. On the one hand, I followed the 
traditions and analytical methods of political science. Inside political science, I particularly used 
the theories, literature and operationalisation of parties and party systems. On the other hand, I 
also used historical events, facts and data. Hence, I could reconcile two different academic 
disciplines: history and political science. Nevertheless, the method of political science largely 
dominates in this dissertation. 
I used Sartori’s (2005:39) definition of party system: 
'party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party 
competition.' 
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This definition had three consequences for my research: typological, temporal and spatial. The 
typological consequence is the fact that party systems can be classified according to different 
criteria. For instance, Duverger (1954) classified party system according to the number of 
parties, Dahl (1966) and Rokkan (1970) according to the government─opposition rivalry, 
Blondel (1968) according to the relative weights of parties, Sartori (1976) according to the 
ideological polarisation of parties, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) according to the level of 
institutionalisation of the party system and Mair (1996) according to the open or closed 
competition for the government in a party system. From these approaches, I particularly relied on 
Sartori’s (1976) categorisation. However, I also used Siaroff’s (2000) method to reconcile the 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of party system categorisations. This typological 
consequence helps us to identify and classify the British party system at a given time and place. 
This also makes possible the evaluation of change in British party politics. 
The second consequence of the definition was the temporal one. It states that the patterns of a 
party system can become stronger or weaker over time. In other words, certain party systems are 
more institutionalised while others are less so. The degree of institutionalisation can cause a 
significant path-dependency or inflexibility over time. For instance, a highly institutionalised 
party system can successfully resist the adaptational pressure coming from the electorate. The 
party system in Britain was one of the most institutionalised (and stable) of those in the second 
half of the 20th century in Europe. The rivalry between the Conservative Party and the Labour 
Party characterised the whole nature of politics. Mair (2009) points out that the British party 
system was the most stable in Europe for a long time. However, the recent changes in the 
patterns of UK party competition have somewhat contradicted this stability. So the temporal 
aspect is very important when we want to understand change in British politics. I used Mair 
(1997) to better interpret party system change in the dissertation. 
The spatial consequence of the definition is probably the most important. A party system can be 
observed in different arenas. Such arenas can be the parliamentary arena (based on party seat 
shares), the electoral arena (based on party vote shares), the governmental, the regional 
(devolution), the local council and the European Parliamentary arenas. Different authors give 
different emphasis to different arenas. For instance, Smith (1989: 165), who used the term ‘split 
party system’ for the first time, emphasised three arenas: the electoral, the parliamentary and the 
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governmental arenas. Mair (1996) focused on the governmental arena and made a distinction 
according to its openness or closeness. Finally, Bardi and Mair (2008: 156─159) makes 
difference according to the vertical, horizontal and functional aspects of the arenas. My research 
used their functional approach. They emphasised two parallel arenas: the parliamentary and the 
electoral arenas. They subsumed Smith’s (1989) original governmental arena under the 
parliamentary arena. I followed their good example. In Britain the governmental arena can be 
indeed subsumed to the parliamentary arena because the British governments were almost 
always single governments and lived in symbiosis with their parliamentary faction. So the 
parliamentary majority was accompanied with single governments. Consequently, I will use two 
arenas to understand the spatial aspect of British politics: the electoral arena and the 
parliamentary arena. 
After discussing the definition and the concepts, I started operationalisation. In order to create a 
scientifically correct operationalisation, I used Enyedi and Bértoa’s (2011) approach. My 
operationalisation hence was the following: 
 Polarisation 
Polarisation wants to understand and measure a party’s ideological position on a scale. There are 
usually different sorts of scales for such measurement. However, I will use the most overarching 
scale which encompasses lots of sub-components: the left-right ideological scale. I used the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) for this purpose. Hence I could measure and quantify the 
ideological positions of the British parties and in particular the two major parties (the 
Conservatives and Labour.) By using this method, I could achieve two goals at the same time: 
first, I could identify individual party positions on a left-right scale and second, I could measure 
the distance between the two major parties. Hence, I could demonstrate that there were certain 
periods when the two-party competition was consensual (and the party manifestos were very 
close to each other) and there were other periods when the two-party competition was polarised 
(and the party manifestos diverged considerably from each other.) The figure below shows us 
this trend in British politics between 1945 and 2015. The positive values stand for right 
(conservative) manifesto promises whilst the negative values attest left (socialist) manifesto 
promises. One can easily notice that the 1945─1974 period was indeed a consensual interval 
based on welfare economics. Both parties were on the left ideological side (negative values) and 
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party positions were very close to each other (low polarisation). However, the 1974─1997 period 
was the opposite: parties significantly diverged from each other (high polarisation) and the party 
manifestos became “very right” on the one hand and remained “very left” on the other hand. One 
can also easily notice that the post-1997 period meant a return to consensual politics (low 
polarisation) mainly on the right ideological side. After 2010, the two-party polarisation 
remained low, however the party manifestos equally moved to the left side. The main reason for 
such movement to the left can be found in the reaction to the 2008─2009 financial and economic 
crises. Both parties backed the bail-out (and nationalisation) of banks and their debts. This step 
was a little bit similar to the post-1945 left consensual era; however, it remained still more on the 
right. 
 
Figure 1. The ideological positions of major UK parties in different electoral years (CMP data) 
 Electoral volatility 
Electoral volatility measures the average vote share change for every party between two general 
elections. It hence offers estimation about how many percentage of the electorate changed their 
electoral party affiliation from one election to another. This method is very useful to measure the 
stability and institutionalisation of the party system as well. I will use Pedersen’s index, which is 
a consensual method in political science to measure electoral volatility (Pedersen, 1979): 
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V =
∑ |Pi,t+1 − Pi,t|
𝑛
𝑖=1
2
 
where n is the number of parties, t is the electoral year, P is the vote share percentage of i 
given party. 
The measurement of electoral volatility is particularly important to identify and confirm critical 
junctures in the evolution of British party politics. In these years, a large segment of the 
electorate changed their party affiliation and the volatility was high. If volatility is low, we can 
think that the party system is quite stable and institutionalised. For instance, in the 1950s, 
electoral volatility was very low and two-party support was stable. However, both in 1945 and in 
1974, electoral volatility was high. Please see the figure below to illustrate this. So volatility was 
usually very high at critical junctures. 
 
Figure 2. Electoral volatility in Britain between 1945 and February 1974 (Pedersen index) 
 Fragmentation 
Last but not least, fragmentation wants to measure the number of parties in the party system. I 
use here again a consensual index in political science: the effective number of parties. This index 
is both very easy to calculate and to understand. If the effective number of parties equals two, we 
can say that the party system contains two same-sized parties. In other words, it is a two-party 
system. If the index is three, there are three equally sized parties in the party system, so we have 
a three-party system, and so on. Moreover, the effective number of parties can be calculated in 
different arenas of the party system. For instance, it can be calculated by parliamentary seat share 
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(in the parliamentary arena) or by electoral vote share (in the electoral arena). Hence, we can 
estimate and compare the fragmentation of the party system in different arenas. The indexes are 
the following: 
The effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP): 
ENPP =∑
1
si2
𝑛
𝑖=0
 
where n is the number of parties, i is a given party and s is the parliamentary seat share. 
The effective number of electoral parties (ENEP): 
ENEP =∑
1
vi2
𝑘
𝑖=0
 
where k is the number of parties, i is a given party and v is the electoral vote share. 
The method of using fragmentation indices leads to further consequences. If the fragmentation 
values of the two arenas are close to each other, we can say that the overlap is good and the 
congruence is high. However, if the fragmentation of the two arenas is very different, we can say 
that the overlap is bad and congruence is low (or incongruence is high.) This method is a useful 
way to estimate the split between the two arenas in the British polity. The figure below 
demonstrates how fragmentation indices diverged from each other between 1945 and 2015. One 
can see that the electoral arena has been diverging from the parliamentary arena since the 1970s. 
This decade is also the beginning of pluralisation and third party success. The incongruence 
between the two arenas has become very high since then. 
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Figure 3. ENEP and ENPP in the UK (1945─2015) 
At the same time, I also measured the disproportionality of the UK first-past-the-post electoral 
system. I used Gallagher’s (LSq) index for this measurement (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2008): 
𝐿𝑆𝑞 = √
1
2
∑(Vi − Si)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
where n is the number of parties, i is the given party, V is the vote share and S is the 
parliamentary seat share. 
The table below summarises the electoral distortion of the first-past-the-post electoral system 
over time in Britain. One can notice that electoral distortion has been growing since the 1970s. It 
usually affected third (smaller) parties very negatively. At the same time, it gave some extra 
leverage for the two major parties. So it was more beneficial for the Conservatives and for 
Labour, one can presume. However, it is just one side of the coin. The other side of the coin is 
that electoral distortion sometimes helped smaller (third) parties for the detriment of bigger 
parties. In the first-past-the post electoral system, the geographic concentration of votes can give 
leverage. Therefore, smaller parties with geographically concentrated votes could benefit from 
the electoral distortion. For instance, this was the case for the Scottish National Party in 2015 
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Liberal Democrats) lost their strongholds in Scotland. Therefore, the SNP could suddenly 
penetrate into the parliamentary arena. So electoral distortion does not automatically help bigger 
parties and hinder smaller ones. Moreover, electoral distortion often decides the outcome of the 
Conservative-Labour rivalry as well. The Conservative Party has often been hindered by the 
first-past-the-post electoral system against the Labour Party. The Conservatives usually had to 
have more vote share for the very same seat share if they wanted to level with Labour. This is 
what exactly decided the outcome of the 2010 general election. In 2010 and in 2015, the 
Conservatives got almost identical vote shares. However, the electoral system negatively 
discriminated them in 2010 and it was neutral for them in 2015. The 2010 electoral bias 
generated a coalition government whilst the 2015 neutrality provided a stable single government 
for them. In sum, high electoral distortion does not always hinder small parties but sometimes 
(and more and more often) bigger parties as well. Therefore, the predictability of the general 
election results has become increasingly problematic recently. The continuous errors of opinion 
polls can prove it. 
Table 3. ENEP, ENPP and LSq values in the UK (1945─2015) 
  LSq ENEP ENPP 
1945 11.62 2.72 2.12 
1950 6.91 2.44 2.08 
1951 2.61 2.13 2.06 
1955 4.13 2.16 2.03 
1959 7.3 2.28 1.99 
1964 8.88 2.53 2.06 
1966 8.44 2.42 2.02 
1970 6.59 2.46 2.07 
1974a 15.47 3.13 2.25 
1974b 14.96 3.15 2.25 
1979 11.58 2.87 2.15 
1983 17.45 3.46 2.09 
1987 14.95 3.33 2.17 
1992 13.55 3.06 2.27 
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1997 16.51 3.22 2.13 
2001 17.76 3.33 2.17 
2005 16.73 3.59 2.46 
2010 15.1 3.71 2.57 
2015 16.58 3.93 2.54 
 
After determining the concepts and the operationalisation, I formulated three hypotheses. These 
hypotheses were intended to test my presumptions about the British party system. They are the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1 – The growing incongruence between the parliamentary and electoral 
arenas was a long-term trend of British party politics between 1945 and 2015. 
H1 states that there was an increasing split in the UK party system between 1945 and 
2015. This split appeared in the form of growing incongruence between the UK 
parliamentary and electoral arenas. The hypothesis supposes two things; first, there has 
been a long-term trend in the evolution of British party politics. This long-term trend was 
characterized by a gradual incongruence between the parliamentary and electoral arenas. 
Second, it also supposes that the post-war patterns of party competition (two-party 
politics) mainly remained in the parliamentary arena; however, the electoral arena 
differed from it. Therefore, the split in the UK party system was caused by both a stable 
parliamentary arena and a pluralising electoral arena. 
Hypothesis 2 – Although the growing incongruence was a long-term trend of British 
party politics, there were also certain periods when it temporarily slowed down or 
reversed. 
The hypothesis wants to find out if there was any period in the history of UK party 
competition when incongruence could have been stopped or reversed. In other words, the 
hypothesis investigates how pre-determined is the pluralisation of British party politics. 
Was it possible at any time to slow down, stop or decrease the pace of pluralisation? If 
we found such short-term periods in the long-term trend of pluralisation, we would also 
need to understand why such short-term set-backs happened. If short-term set-backs are 
likely, the entire nature of long-term pluralisation is different. Hence, H2 can serve both 
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tools; to further confirm H1 by saying that pluralisation is a very stable trend, or to 
sophisticate H1 by saying that, though pluralisation is a long-term trend, sometimes short 
term set-backs can happen. In both two cases, we can understand the patterns of British 
party competition better. 
Hypothesis 3 – The growing incongruence between the parliamentary and electoral 
arenas was never large enough to trigger the electoral system change of the UK general 
elections. 
The hypothesis tries to evaluate the potential consequence that a split in the UK party 
system can lead to. If incongruence is significant, one could think that the UK 
parliamentary arena is not responsive to the electoral arena. This lack of responsiveness 
also suggests that the FPTP electoral system can be blamed for such an outcome. 
However, if the electoral system is changed for a mixed or PR one, the level of 
incongruence can decline. So the growing incongruence could have generated a demand 
for electoral system change over time. I want to find correlation between the growing 
incongruence and the likelihood of electoral system change in Britain between 1945 and 
2015. 
The electoral data used in this dissertation was available on the UK Parliament website. 
Particularly, I used the following source: Commons Briefing Paper (2017) No. CBP-7529 UK 
Election Statistics: 1918-2017. This paper was available both in .pdf and in .xls files. So I could 
make my own calculations with these data as well. Another electoral source was the Political 
Science Resources website (http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk.htm). Moreover, I also 
included maps with prior permission from Dr Benjamin Hennig 
(http://www.viewsoftheworld.net/) and from Vision of Britain through Time 
(http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/). 
During my stay in Britain, I also made academic interviews with British politicians about topical 
questions in British politics. Although originally I wanted to include the findings of these 
interviews in my dissertation, in order to avoid methodological mistakes and statistical bias, I 
decided to leave them out. I could only make six interviews, which is too small a sample for 
statistically representative research. So I made reading these interviews optional at the end of my 
dissertation (in the annex). I also included a short comparison of the interviews there. I am very 
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grateful to these politicians for helping me understand British politics! I list these politicians and 
their party affiliations below: Lord Beecham (Labour), Lord Balfe (Conservatives), Lord 
Wallace (Lib Dems), Kelvin Hopkins, MP (Labour), Douglas Carswell, MP (UKIP) and Paul 
Monaghan, MP (SNP.) I asked them the same six questions: (1) the causes of pluralisation in 
British party politics, (2) the EU’s impact on UK party politics, (3) the possibility of an electoral 
system change in Britain, (4) the strength of party line in their respective parties, (5) the 
importance of devolution to pluralisation and (6) the politicians’ own perception of anti-
establishment sentiment in Britain. 
3. The results of the dissertation 
The 1945 general election was indeed a critical juncture in the evolution of British politics. This 
was the moment when the Conservative─Labour dichotomy was born. Before the 1945 general 
election, it was not clear which party would be the counterpart of the Conservative Party on the 
left. Both the Liberals and Labour rivalled each other. However, in 1945, it was decided that 
Labour would become the only party on the left. The 1945 general election had also a long path-
dependency. Almost every succeeding general election reflected the results of the 1945 general 
election in some way. For instance, the 1974 general election might have questioned the post-war 
two-partyism, Margaret Thatcher might have questioned the post-war welfare consensus, Labour 
landslide victory might have confirmed the 1945 patterns and the 2010 coalition government 
might have questioned the 1945 patterns, however, every time there was a reference to the very 
same general election. So the 1945 general election became a pro et contra reference in the 
second half of the 20th century. 
The consequences of the 1945 general election were dual: on the one hand, it created two-
partyism. Two parties (the Conservatives and Labour) competed against each other with an 
almost complete overlap between the electoral and parliamentary arenas. Third parties were 
marginal, electoral support was stable and single governments were strong. On the other hand, 
this two-party competition was characterized by a welfare economic consensus, too. Both parties 
agreed and supported full employment, public services and even nationalisation. Perhaps the 
most palpable evidence of the path dependency and heritage of this time is the creation of the 
National Health Service (NHS). It has been supported by every major party since then. 
21 
 
Moreover, class differences were also strong between the Conservatives and Labour at that time. 
It meant that party identification and voting loyalty was very high among the electorate in favour 
of their preferred party. In other words, people’s attachment to their respective party was 
stronger than their policy preferences. General elections were only decided by a handful of 
hesitating voters who did not know which party to choose. Therefore, the results of the general 
elections in the 1950s and 1960s were always very tight. The whole party system was dominated 
by two parties. 
The change started to happen from the 1970s. The popularity of third parties was on the rise. 
This phenomenon caused pluralisation in the electoral arena whereas two-party stability still 
remained in the parliamentary arena. Hence, incongruence started to characterize the relationship 
between the different arenas of the UK party system. Nevertheless, this incongruence remained 
still limited. The popularity of third parties was fuelled by de-alienation. This phenomenon 
meant that voters started to detach from their original class preferences. Instead, they often voted 
for other parties because of their manifestos. Hence electoral volatility rose and the whole 
stability of the post-war British party system started to erode. If party identification was decided 
by class politics between 1945 and 1974, it was issue politics (and manifesto promises) after the 
1970s. Therefore, the 1970s did not only mean the start of pluralisation but also a change in party 
identification: class competition made place for issue competition. In 1979, this new issue 
competition was demonstrated by Margaret Thatcher’s rupture with the post-war economic 
consensus (which was neoliberal politics.) During the upcoming years (1979─1997), the two 
major parties had a polarized party competition over issues: the Conservatives supported 
neoliberalism whilst Labour stuck to the post-war economic consensus. Although de-alienation 
resulted that the Conservative and Labour Parties have become similar in class competition, the 
other aspect of competition (issue competition) has significantly differentiated the two parties 
from each other. The different party manifestos, promises and polarized campaigns helped the 
electorate to make a clear distinction between them. 
This sort of clue for the electorate (to make difference based on issues) has started to evaporate 
since the arrival of Tony Blair and New Labour at the Labour Party. Tony Blair’s idea to give up 
Clause IV and move the Labour Party to the right by accepting Margaret Thatcher’s legacy 
resulted in two very similar major parties. The Conservatives and Labour had become similar 
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both in class and issue competition. Due to de-alienation, the class difference between the two 
parties was already relatively small. Electoral volatility was high, which was confirmed by 
Labour’s landslide electoral victory in 1997. So we had two very similar big parties both in class 
support and in issue politics after 1997. In other words, it was very difficult to make difference 
between the two major parties. Although the 1945─1974 period was also a consensual period 
(post-war welfare consensus), the class differences of the era still helped the electorate to 
distinguish between the Conservatives and the Labour Party. After 1997, the new consensual 
period (neoliberal consensus) coincided with no or limited class differences. I argue that this 
two-party similarity led to the political changes after 2010. 
I call the 2010─2015 critical juncture the burst of pluralisation. Previously, I have demonstrated 
that pluralisation was on the rise since the 1970s. This pluralisation, however, only affected the 
electoral arena and not (really) the parliamentary arena. Even the 1997 landslide Labour victory 
made the impression that two-party politics remained the backbone of British politics. In this 
context, the 2010 coalition government was a big surprise for many. This was the first clear sign 
of pluralisation inside the parliamentary arena. Later, after 2010, the signs of pluralisation 
continued: the 2011 AV referendum was initiated by the Lib Dems, the 2014 EP elections were 
won by UKIP (the first time after 1945 that a third party could win), the Scottish independence 
referendum was initiated by the SNP and David Cameron’s 2013 Brexit promise was very much 
influenced by UKIP’s growing popularity. I argue that all these events arose from two parallel 
things: on the one hand, growing incongruence between the parliamentary and electoral arenas 
(which caused legitimacy problems) and on the other hand, the neoliberal consensual politics 
between Labour and the Conservatives after 1997 (which only partially mirrored the electoral 
preferences of the wider British society). These two phenomena gave fertile grounds for a third 
phenomenon called anti-establishment sentiment. I argue that the conflicting nature of British 
politics, which was traditionally characterised by the Government-Opposition dichotomy has 
disappeared since 1997. This conflict was class politics between 1945 and 1974. It was issue 
politics between 1974 and 1997. However, this conflict gradually disappeared after 1997. At the 
same time pluralisation still continued latently under the surface. So a new conflict suddenly 
erupted in 2010. I call this new conflict the conflict between the established and anti-established 
parties. So the traditional left-right competition got suddenly a new dimension: the 
established─anti-established or bottom-up conflict. Now, Labour and the Conservatives should 
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both compete against each other and against smaller third parties as well (i.e. Lib Dems, SNP, 
UKIP, Greens etc.) Moreover, third parties also compete against each other. In 2015, the collapse 
of the Lib Dems happened in parallel with the rise of the SNP (in seat share), UKIP and Greens 
(in vote shares). So third parties also compete against each other. Today, a three-dimensional 
competition characterises British politics: the Conservative─Labour competition, the 
established─anti-established competition and the competition among third parties. It is easy to 
accept that this party system is very far from the initial two-party system of the 1950s. 
At the end of my dissertation, I used the initial hypotheses to test the validity of my findings 
about the change of British party politics. The first hypothesis stated that the growing 
incongruence between the electoral and parliamentary arenas was a long-term trend of British 
party politics between 1945 and 2015. I could verify this hypothesis by using ENEP/ENPP data. 
I could also confirm that the trend was particularly strong for the ENEP data (electoral arena) 
between the 1992─2015 interval. Otherwise, the parliamentary arena provided also good fit. So 
the growing incongruence was indeed a long-term trend in British party politics between 1945 
and 2015. 
The second hypothesis said that although the growing incongruence was a long-term trend of 
British politics, there were certain periods when it temporarily stopped or declined. By using the 
same ENEP/ENPP data, I could figure out that the period between 1979 and 1997 had indeed 
certain electoral years when pluralisation stopped or dropped in the electoral arena. (Please see 
the figure below.) During this period, it was only the 1983 general election when ENEP 
temporarily jumped up due to the internal conflicts inside the Labour Party. This was the time 
when the Social Democrats left the Labour party and later joined the Liberals, which led to the 
birth of the Liberal Democrats. Nevertheless, this period had rather declining ENEP values. So I 
can accept the second hypothesis. Moreover, I also found reasons why this decline could have 
happened. The decline in third party support coincided with one of the most polarized party 
competition between the Conservatives and Labour after 1945. In my opinion, this polarized 
party competition helped major parties to get back their votes from third parties. Voters felt that 
their vote was decisive in the outcome of the tight race between the two major parties. So any 
vote for a third party would have been wasted. However, when the same two parties had 
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consensual competition after 1997, pluralisation took off again. Therefore, pluralisation and 
polarisation are two interdependent phenomena. 
 
Figure 4. The relationship between the pluralisation of the electoral arena (ENEP) and the 
polarisation between the Conservative and Labour parties (CMP diff) (The left scale is the 
absolute benchmark of party system fragmentation and the right scale is the relative benchmark 
of party manifesto differences (in %.)) 
The third hypothesis said that the lack of electoral system reform is due to the still low 
incongruence between the electoral and parliamentary arenas. In other words, the more 
incongruence rises the more likely is an electoral system reform. This presumption is based on 
the fact that pluralisation brought electoral system change on the political agenda in the 1970s. 
Back in the 1950s and 1960s, when congruence was still almost perfect between the 
parliamentary and electoral arenas, the electoral system reform was not part of the political 
debate. So we can presume that incongruence brought electoral system change on the agenda. In 
order to test this hypothesis, I analysed both British and other foreign cases to understand 
electoral system change. In the British case, I observed those cases when electoral system change 
was close or it was actually carried out. Thus, I looked at the political events around the Jenkins 
Committee, the introduction of new electoral systems in Scotland, Wales, London and Northern 
Ireland, the electoral system change at EP elections in 1999 and, finally, the 2011 AV 
referendum. I have particularly focused on the 2011 AV referendum because it was the closest 
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moment when the first-past-the-post electoral system was dropped. The Jenkins Committee was 
much further from it, the EP elections might have had an electoral system change but it only 
affected a secondary arena, and the new electoral systems of the devolved arenas were also 
somewhat secondary. Therefore, the 2011 AV referendum was the only attempt which wanted to 
change the first-past-the-post electoral system and it was very close to it (in opposition to the 
recommendations of the Jenkins Committee). I analysed the 2011 AV referendum in detail in my 
dissertation. 
Furthermore, I also analysed a foreign electoral system reform. I used the 1993 New Zealand 
electoral system reform to understand any potential changes in Britain. The reason for doing so 
lies in the similar political and electoral systems in Britain and New Zealand (same political 
traditions, electoral system, political culture etc.). In New Zealand, the evolution of party politics 
was very similar to that of Britain: the incongruence between the parliamentary and electoral 
arenas gradually increased and it later caused democratic and legitimacy crisis. I used the New 
Zealand case study to evaluate a potential electoral system change in Britain. I could see that 
both in the British and the New Zealand case studies the growing incongruence between the 
electoral and parliamentary arenas was not enough alone for an electoral system change. So I had 
to reject hypothesis three. In Britain, electoral system change did not even happen (the 2011 AV 
referendum was unsuccessful) and in New Zealand it happened for other reasons. Nevertheless, 
there was one key endeavour in both cases which helped electoral system reform: it was the 
momentum of contingent (unexpected) events. I could understand that the fast flow of new and 
unexpected events which undermined the legitimacy of the first-past-the-post electoral system 
was more important than the continuously growing incongruence. I could see that the momentum 
of unexpected events was rather slow before the 2011 AV referendum, so it failed. In contrast, 
the momentum of contingent events was very fast before the 1993 New Zealand electoral system 
reform. So this is the reason why a relatively moderate incongruence between the electoral and 
parliamentary arenas in New Zealand could have generated an electoral system change. So I 
rejected the third hypothesis. Growing incongruence is not enough for electoral system change. 
Nevertheless, I can also accept that the growing incongruence can ignite the fast chain-reaction 
of contingent events. In other words, growing incongruence and legitimacy concerns might lead 
to political events which, in turn, cause an electoral system reform. However, the mere existence 
of incongruence is not enough for an electoral system reform. Please see in the figure below that 
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the UK had sometimes higher incongruence than New Zealand. Yet, there has not been electoral 
system reform. So incongruence and the momentum of contingent events are equally important. 
 
Figure 5. The incongruence between the parliamentary and electoral arenas (ENEP─ENPP 
relative difference) in New Zealand and in Great Britain 
In sum, the future of British politics has become more and more unpredictable. The main reason 
for this lack of predictability arises from the divergence of the parliamentary and electoral 
arenas. In this situation, there are parallel competitions in a multi-level polity. The Conservatives 
and Labour must react and accommodate to the changed competitions in each parallel arena. 
This has generated a new three dimensional competition: a competition between the 
Conservatives and Labour, a competition between the established and anti-established parties 
and a third competition among third parties themselves. The pluralisation in the electoral arena 
does not affect the parliamentary arena directly and immediately. However, sooner or later, 
change in the electoral arena spills over into the parliamentary arena as well. This is what we 
could see between 2010 and 2015. It was a surprise from the Westminster democracy 
perspective; however, it was expected from the split party system perspective. We could also see 
that the two major parties try to respond to this. For them, the most successful reaction could be 
polarisation. So there is still a long way to go before. However, there is one thing which has high 
probability: the split in the UK party system will produce similarly unexpected events in the 
future, too. 
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